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CORRESPONDENCE
STATE'S CONTROL OF ITS WILD LIFE
To the Editors of the ILLINOIS LAW REvi-w:
The March number of your Review- contains a comment by
Judge Andrew A. Bruce upon the recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the cases of Foster-FountainPacking Company v. Hayde2 and L. 0. Johnson, Jr., and Sea Food Company v.
Haydel5 in which the author expresses sharp disagreement with the
decisions upon the grounds advanced by the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice McReynolds.

The writer ismoved to the following ex-

1. At p. 705.
2. (1928) 49 Sup. Ct. 1.
3. (1928) 49 Sup. Ct. 6.
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pression, not by the unimportant circumstance that he himself happens to approve the decisions, but because he feels that some important aspects of the cases have not been discussed by Judge
Bruce.
The facts in the two cases are set out fully in the opinions
and in Judge Bruce's note. One statement of fact made in that
note is open to correction and another to possible qualification, so
far as they apply to the shrimp case. The author states that the
complainants were not citizens and taxpayers of Louisiana. On the
contrary one complainant in that case was a Louisiana corporation
whose shipments of raw shrimp from the marshes of that state
to the packing plants at Biloxi, Mississippi, were in effect proscribed
by the statute. 4 He also states that the shrimp "reside" in the
Louisiana marshes. But it appears from an earlier case in which
a federal district court held a similar Alabama statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause that these shrimp do not have a
permanent habitat, but that they migrate seasonally between Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama waters.5 If this be a fact, another
practical reason is afforded for holding the shrimp statute invalid.
If Alabama and Mississippi are induced by Louisiana's action to
pass similar legislation in retaliation, packing companies will be
forced to maintain plants in all three states if they desire to obtain
a steady supply of raw material, or else to discontinue their production during a large part of the year. Either alternative is a
wasteful and uneconomic one, tending to render the business unprofitable or else to increase the cost of the manufactured product to
the consumer.
Judge Bruce finds unanswerable the argument of Mr. justice
McReynolds. He points out that the prior decisions of the Supreme
Court have recognized a proprietary interest in the state in wild
fish and game within its territories ;6 that they sustain the power
of a state to reserve the consumption thereof to its own citizens
or residents; that they have held valid prohibitions of all shipments
thereof out of the state.7 He maintains that it follows from these
decisions by invincible logic that a state has power under the Constitution to do what Louisiana endeavored in effect to do here, viz.,
to permit other states to share in the enjoyment of such resources
only upon the condition that the profitable processes of manufacturing and preparing them for sale in the interstate market are carried
on within the state. gn other words, since "Louisiana absolutelys
owns its game and its fish as a trustee for its people,"9 it must follow
4. Acts of the State of La. (1926). The "shrimp" act is Act No. 103;
the statute relating to oysters Act No. 258.
5. Elnwr v. Wallace (D. C. Ala. 1921) 275 Fed. 86.
6. Corfield v. Coryell (1825) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3230;
McCready v. Virginia (1877) 94 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 1205, 24 L. Ed. 248.

7. Geer v. Connecticut (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L.
Ed. 793.
8. Italics mine.
9. Supra, note 1, at p. 706. It is true the state has sometimes been
spoken of as a trustee of its game and fish for the benefit of its people. Yet
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that it can assert that proprietorship in such manner as to deprive
established industries in other states of their supply of raw materials,
although the object of such action is not conservation of a limited
source of food supply for the benefit of local consumers but rather
to compel by such artificial means a centralization of the packing
industry in the state.
We submit that this sort of reasoning is open to serious objections. Its major premise involves the assumption that these precedents require as their ratio decidendi a state ownership of wild
game and fish which is absolute in its nature. No doubt some support for such an assumption may be found in the broad language of
certain judicial opinions. But surely nowhere is it more essential
than in the field of constitutional law that the language of judges
be interpreted in the light of the concrete questions those judges
were called upon to decide. What has been the nature of those
questions? It has been indicated above. Does a state possess such
power over its resources of wild game and fish that it can limit their
actual use and consumption to its citizens or residents without coming into collision with the equal privileges and immunities clause
or the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution?1o Can
a state in the exercise of its police powers protect such resources
from wasteful exploitation and depletion?" Can a state in the interest of convenient administration and enforcement of such legislation make unlawful the possession of game or fish with the purpose of transporting same from the state,'2 or the possession thereof
though shipped in from another state?' 3 Does a state have such
an interest in its fur-bearing animals that it may impose a severance
it can hardly be maintained that there is any strict trust relationsbih. No
court has denied that the state may permit non-residents and non-citizens to
hunt and fish upon the same basis as its own people, or intimated that a state
would be violating any trust obligations in so doing. It is a strange sort of
trust in which the trustee has unlimited power thus to enlarge the number
of cestuis who may share in the enjoyment of the res.
10. Corfield v. Coryell supra, note 6; McCready v. Virginia supra, note
6. No question of interstate commerce was involved in these cases. They
merely decide that the privilege of hunting and fishing or of engazing in
oyster culture in public waters is not so fundamental in character that these
constitutional provisions protect it from abridgement in favor of the state's
own citizens.
11. Geer v. Connectcut supra, note 7; Ward v. Race Horse (1896) 163
U. S. 504, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076. 41 L. Ed. 244: Patsone v. Penns.lvania (1914)
232 U. S, 134, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539. It should be noted that these
powers extend likewise to prevention of wasteful exploitation of mineral
waters and natural gas in the process of reduction to possession and, in the
case of natural gas at least, even after reduction to possession: Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana (1900) 177 U. S. 190. 20 Sup. Ct. Ren. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729: Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 61. 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, 55 L.
Ed. 569; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. (1920) 254 U. S. 30, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.
118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
12. Geer v. Connecticut supra, note 7. A similar doctrine has been applied
to water resources. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908) 20O
U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
13. Silz v. Hesterberg (1908) 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. 53 L.
Ed. 75.
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tax for the privilege of reducing same to private ownership? 4 These
are typical of the questions which the Supreme Court has resolved
favorably to the state's power. It is not perceived wherein the
determination of any of them necessitates the recognition of an
ownership in the state so absolute as to be beyond all constitutional
limitations. Because the Constitution as interpreted permits a state
to impose more varied and extensive conditions and restrictions upon
the creation of rights of private ownership in fish and game than
in other things, why does it follow in rerum natura that any and
all restrictions and conditions must be valid? The most that can
be said is that the Supreme Court has now qualified certain broad
dicta in earlier cases; it has not overruled actual decisions. On the
contrary the court has uttered warnings that this proprietary power,
like other powers of a state, is subject to some constitutional limitations.15 And the result now reached by the Supreme Court can
scarcely be deemed surprising in view of the federal court decision
on the validity of the Alabama statute. 6
Moreover, these statutes appear to be a rather clumsy and transparent effort to evade an earlier decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court holding a statute having a similar purpose invalid under the
commerce clause.' 7 The state court there drew a clear distinction
between bona fide conservation legislation and legislation intended
to discriminate in favor of local industries competing with similar
industries in other states in interstate commerce. Certainly a court
must close its eyes to the facts in order to hold the recent statutes
valid as conservation legislation. The material they would conserve, viz., oyster shells and shrimp heads and hulls, is of small value,
and there is little existing need or demand for it. It must not be
forgotten that these statutes do not limit at all the amount of shrimp
and oysters which may be gathered and shipped out of the state,
provided they are prepared for market in local factories. But
if the state of Louisiana should decide to place an embargo upon
all shipments of shrimp and oysters from the state, even though the
14. La Coste v. Department of Conservation of Louisiana (192-4) 263
U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L. Ed. 437. In Swiss Oil Co. v. Shanks (1927)

273 U. S. 407, 47 Sup. Ct. 393, 71 L. Ed. 709, a state license tax upon the
production of petroleum was also sustained.
15. La Coste v. Department of Conservation, supra, note 14, at 549, 550.
16. Supra, note 5.

17. State v. Ferrandau (1912) 130 La. 1035, 58 So. 870. It is true that

it is stated in this case that the shipment of oysters involved was out of a
private bed. But a reading of the opinion shows that the court held the act
of 1910 to be invalid even if it were assumed that the state might interdict
all shipments of oysters out of the state, whether grown in public or private
waters. And sec. 15 of the oyster act of 1926 operates to apply the provisions of .the act to all oysters shipped from the state. The 1910 act did
state frankly the real purpose of the legislature, whereas in the 1926 act an
effort is made to conceal the actual design by the insertion of the provisions
relating to the conservation of the shells of the oyster and the heads and hulls
of the shrimps. This material is proved to be of small value and in little
demand. Ought the courts to feel bound in such a case by the legislative
declaration of purpose when it is clearly contrary to the facts?
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available supply far exceeded the local demand, it could not be said
that this would not in fact be conservation legislation. Its effect
would be to preserve these resources for possible future needs.
The plain fact is that the Supreme Court has made another application of the now-familiar doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Powers possessed by the states must not be exercised to secure results which in the court's view are offensive to the Constitution. It
is of no avail to criticise this doctrine as illogical, and as violative
of the maxim that a whole must include all of its parts. It has become firmly established in our constitutional law, and the passage
of time has witnessed an increasingly varied use of it by the court.'"
The doctrine affords a convenient device for avoiding the consequences of judge-made definitions of governmental powers, when
subsequent developments show such definitions to be undesirably
broad. It is often impossible to define with accuracy a priori the
limits of a particular whole, or even to do so with the aid of the
available decisions. Furthermore, because of the elastic quality of
the Constitution, what seems a well defined whole today may prove
to be something less tomorrow. 19
The instant situation does not present a logical dilemma. The
choice is not restricted to a limitation of the state's power to deal
with its fish and game to those powers of regulation it possesses with
reference to other kinds of property, on the one hand, or a concession to the state of absolute power on the other. Intermediate
gradations of power are possible. The state can act until its action
brings it into conflict with national interests which the Constitution
protects. By reason of the peculiar characteristics 6f the subjectmatter, it can go further in dealing with fish and game than in other
cases before these national interests block the way.
Whether it is wise or desirable for the Supreme Court to limit
state power at this point is, it may be freely conceded, a question
admitting of reasonable difference of opinion. But it is contended
that that question ought to be decided, like other questions arising
under the commerce clause, by practical reasoning instead of by
resort to abstract logic. Interstate commerce is a practical conception
18. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30
Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts (1918)
246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 62 L. Ed. 624; Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188, 66 L. Ed. 352; and particularly Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding (1926) 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 179, 71 L. Ed. 372. For other applications of the doctrine see Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope (1914) 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster (1918) 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438,
62 L. Ed. 1006; Michigan.Commission v. Duke (1925) 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 191, 69 L. Ed. 445; Frost v. Railroad Com'mission of California
(1926) 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
19. Thus in Terral v. Burke Construction Co., supra, Note 18, the
Supreme Court decisively overruled its earlier decisions in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1877) 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148, and Security Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt (1906) 202 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 1013.
The effect of such a decision assuredly is to subtract from the totality of
state power over foreign corporations.
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and the established courses of business not only do but ought to
play a part in the determination of its content. 20 The states have not
been deprived by these decisions of their power to enact reasonable
measures of conservation. They may still, no doubt, reserve the
privilege of hunting and fishing within their territories to their own
citizens. They are simply not permitted to use their powers to discriminate against the commerce and industries of other states, if they
desire to release these resources for use in interstate commerce. But,
while Louisiana may still possess the power to play "dog in the
manger" with her extensive potential supplies of shrimp and oysters
by forbidding all shipments thereof out of the state, economic considerations will in all probability prevent the adoltion of such a
policy. It would injure Louisiana as much or more than anyone else.
To the writer the principal cases seem quite in accord with
21
one of the primary purposes of the commerce clause.

It is sub-

mitted that the Supreme 'Court has wisely sterilized in the inception
22
a possible or even probable cause of state conflict and retaliation.
ARTHUR H. KENT.*

20. Public Utilities Commission for the State of Kansas v. Landon
(1919) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577; Pennsylvania v. WesA
Virginia (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 117.
21. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 929, 31 Sup.
Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
22. (January, 1929) 3 Cin. L. Rev. 64, 68.
*Associate Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

